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ABSTRACT
Scholars from various different disciplines have argued that 
the study of communicative breakdown in everyday verbal exchange 
provides valuable evidence of how human interactive endeavour is 
accomplished, since the nature of such accomplishment is not amenable 
to direct investigation. However, to our knowledge, there has 
been no systematic programme of research to consider the nature of 
this evidence nor indeed any attempt, other than on an ad hoc basis, 
to identify the structural criteria and types of interaction that 
can occur because of some failure to communicate successfully. By 
discussing what such a programme might involve with reference to 
the study of one particular type of breakdown, namely 'misunder­
standing' , this paper aims to illustrate the potentially rich 
contribution that a study of this kind can make in developing an 
appropriately evidenced analysis of communicative events in general.1
1. Introduction
Since scholars in various different disciplines have 
increasingly responded to Firth's (1957:35) suggestion that we study 
'conversation' as a means of facilitating our understanding of 
'what language really is and how it works', the question of what 
it is to achieve communicative success in everyday talk has become 
the subject of considerable, and often cross-disciplinary, 
fascination. However, whatever the disciplinary motivation of the 
individual concerned or the particular nature of his/her interest, 
the would be analyst of the communicative process is faced with a 
difficulty as perplexing in kind as Labov's ubiquitous 'Observer's 
Paradox.' The difficulty is essentially 'interpretive' in nature 
and is neatly summarized by Goffman (1976:278) who notes, 'How 
individuals arrive at an effective interpretation on all those 
occasions when the stream of experience makes this easy and 
instantaneous is not much explored, this exploration being rather 
difficult to undertake from a sitting position.' But if not from 
a 'sitting position' where else can the analyst start? How can we
2 HUMPHREYS-JONES & McGREGOR
begin to access the dynamism of interactional processes that are 
simply not amenable to direct investigation?
Widdowson (1979:70-71) suggests that there are essentially two 
ways of broaching these questions:
One can on the one hand, deal with instances 
of discourse from the point of view of the 
third person analyst, that is to say; one can 
treat discourse in detachment from its 
instantiation, after the event, as a product.
On the other hand, one can deal with the 
discourse from the point of view of the 
participants caught, as it were, in the act; 
that is to say, one can treat discourse as a 
process.
Although we shall consider the kinds of contribution that may be 
made by both these approaches, our primary concern on this occasion 
will be to discuss the possibilities offered by developing a 
'process' type analysis of the kind presented in Humphreys-Jones 
(1986a; 1986b; 1986c; 1987).
Whatever approach one chooses, however, it should be remembered 
that any analysis of what speakers have achieved or are perceived 
to be 'doing' through talk is, in participant terms, 'always an 
EMERGENT phenomenon, explicitly specifiable only in retrospect 
(and then by way of simplifying procedures that may well distort 
their experience)' (Dore and McDermott 1982:386). Consequently, 
the very best we can achieve as analysts of 'what has gone on' is 
to provide EVIDENCE for our claims. What evidence, then, can we 
provide for establishing that something has gone wrong in the course 
of some particular conversational exchange and what can this 
contribute to our understanding of the nature of everyday 
communicative activity?
2. The Study of Communicative Breakdown
Communicative breakdown has been investigated by scholars from 
various different disciplinary backgrounds who make very similar 
kinds of claim about what such research has to offer. Compare, 
for example, the research orientation of Gumperz and Tannen 
(1979:329) who explain that 'by studying what has gone wrong when 
communication breaks down, we seek to understand a process that 
goes unnoticed when it is successful' , with that of Stubbs (1983:241) 
who argues that, 'By looking at what happens when people fail to 
get the message across, at why this happens and at what speakers 
do in order to reinstate the normal smooth flow of interaction,
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one can gain insight into the routine structures of behaviour' 
(Stubbs 1983:241). There is thus a strong belief that the study of 
communicative breakdown can offer insight into the process of 
communication itself.
How then might one proceed to analyse instances of communicative 
breakdown? What kinds of structure can be identified? And what 
kinds of problem does the analyst have to face in the process? 
These questions are best considered in the light of current attempts 
to investigate discourse that is perceived to have caused 
interactional difficulties for its participants.
Primarily sociolinguistic in orientation, these studies have 
variously focussed on repair sequencing in conversation; how 
particular understandings, including misunderstanding, have been 
reached; interpretive procedures and participant roles in discourse 
contexts that have resulted in misunderstandings; and inter-ethnic 
and inter-dialectal misunderstandings. The nature of this work is 
worth considering in some detail and consequently we shall review 
the contribution of selected studies from each area of focus in 
turn.
Early work on communicative breakdown was to emerge as a 
consequence of ethnometho do logical interest in sequential patterning 
in the organization of conversation. Jefferson (1972), for example, 
dealt with the issue of whether or not participants resolve 
misunderstandings when something is perceived to have gone wrong 
and investigated the procedures by which participants then went on 
to repair any breakdown so that the conversation might continue. 
Jefferson argued that the repair sequences which she isolated are 
rule-governed. One of the 'side sequences' which she details 
(1972:304) is a 'misapprehension sequence' in which 'there is a 
statement of sorts, a misapprehension of sorts and a clarification 
of sorts: (s) - (m) - (c) . ' The option to clarify is the 
clarifier's when it is he/she who shows the (m) has occurred, the 
(m) being open to other interpretations, and is the (m) - speaker's 
when the (m) - speaker shows that (s) needs to be clarified, thus 
obliging the (s) - speaker to clarify his/her utterance. These 
two options refer to different conversational problems for the 
participants: the first of these is a misunderstanding in the sense 
it will be used in this paper, that is, a failure to understand 
correctly; the second is a request for clarification or a signal 
that something in (s) is not correct or cannot be interpreted, 
which effectively enables the interlocutors to avoid a potential 
misunderstanding.
Adjacency between the three utterances (s) - (m) - (c) , is 
implied and indeed if they were not adjacent the notion of 'side 
sequence' would be lost because the metatopic it constitutes would
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be integrated with the overall topic. However, the hearer' response 
which manifests his/her misunderstanding of the speaker's utterance 
could occur several utterances and/or speaker turns after the 
original misunderstood utterance; clarification could follow at an 
indeterminate number of utterances and speaker turns later. This 
clarification could be undertaken by more than one participant and 
could extend through more than one utterance and/or turn. The 
extent of a misunderstanding could thus be potentially greater and 
more complex than (s) - (m) - (c). Jefferson does not intend the 
three parts of her 'misapprehension sequence' to be definitive and 
she names them ' for convenience, ' the names providing ' a way to 
handle them readily' (1972:304). This approach is unfortunate 
because by not defining 'misapprehension', Jefferson risks talking 
about different, though related, phenomena as one phenomenon; 
'misunderstanding,' 'misapprehension' and 'no comprehension' are 
used inter - changeably. Thus experiencing difficulty in understanding 
an utterance differs from incorrectly understanding an utterance 
which also differs from not having any understanding of an utterance. 
Yet all of these possibilities concern communicative problems which 
participants have the capacity to resolve and all may well involve 
sequences within the conversation.
Schwartz (1977) is similarly concerned with the sequencing of 
misunderstanding and also with the ways in which misunderstandings 
are detected and resolved. His 'interpretive method' yields an 
elaborate commentary on the three utterances which constitute his 
example of a misunderstanding. The commentary is supported by 
additional data but is specific to the example given so that the 
cause of that misunderstanding, the roles of the interlocutors and 
the content of the utterances are detailed.
Schwartz's definition of misunderstanding, 'By "misunder­
standing” I mean an interpretive error that is discovered by its 
maker at least two utterances after it has been made' (1977, in 
1978:3) raises a number of questions which we would suggest warrant 
further examination. Is the 'maker' of a misunderstanding the one 
whose utterance is misunderstood or the one who misunderstands it? 
In what way is a misunderstanding 'discovered' - is it the 
realization that it has occurred or is it the admission of its 
occurrence in the conversation? What, in the turn sequence, 
constitutes 'two utterances after it has been made'? When, indeed, 
is a misunderstanding made - after the utterance has been expressed 
or simultaneously on hearing it? Why should 'two utterances' be 
significant? ’
As a result of limiting himself to one datum, Schwartz can claim 
that 'utterance,' 'reply' and 'correction' follow successively and 
that a misunderstanding is discovered in a certain order, namely, 
by the speaker first and then by the hearer when the speaker corrects
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him/her. This order need not necessarily be the only one: it is 
quite possible that a hearer realizes that he/she has misunderstood 
an utterance before the speaker of that utterance realizes the 
misunderstanding has occurred, or indeed the hearer may have realized 
that a misunderstanding has occurred in the light of utterances 
subsequent to the one misunderstood, in which case the sequence of 
utterance, reply and correction is broken by other utterances.
However, Schwartz makes the interesting observation that there 
is a communicative skill in dealing with a misunderstanding as a 
misunderstanding. He points out that failure to share an 
interpretation of an utterance is not necessarily a misunderstanding:
A hearer interpreting a remark's meaning 
differently than its producer, and the hearer 
showing the producer this, doth not, by itself, 
a misunderstanding make. Conversationalists 
may not treat this as a technical or linguistic 
difficulty, but as a political, moral, or 
psychological one. Treating something as a 
misunderstanding, then, is as much an 
interpretive accomplishment of speaker-hearer 
as treating something as a joke or story.
We can usefully contrast Schwartz's definition of 
misunderstanding with that cited by Zaefferer (1977) who focusses 
on the cause of misunderstanding from a theoretical pragmatic point 
of view.
Zaefferer (1977) gives a formal definition of misunderstanding 
and discusses a constructed datum. His definition incorporates 
context, in terms of the environment in which the utterance is 
situated:
A person I has misunderstood or has an incorrect 
understanding (with respect to language L) of 
some sound event SE in context C if and only 
if there are states of affairs SA' , C' such that
(1) SE has occurred
(2) C holds
(3) SA holds because SE counts in C as bringing about SA 
(according to L),
(4) I believes (i) that (1), (ii) that C' holds (iii) that 
SA' holds because SE counts in C' as bringing about SA' 
(according to L) and
(5) SA is not the same as SA' (Zaefferer 1977:331-2).
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According to this definition a misunderstanding occurs when a 
hearer, ('I'), has an incorrect belief about the context in which 
an utterance is expressed. A particular state of affairs 
automatically holds if it is brought about by a sound event in a 
particular context. A hearer could not therefore misunderstand a 
sound event if he/she believed the context to be the one which 
actually obtained at the time of the sound event. Zaefferer does 
not explain what is meant by 'context,' although the burden of his 
definition rests on it. One has to assume that it refers to 
constraints which restrict an utterance to a particular meaning in 
a particular spatio-temporal location. It seems possible that a 
hearer can correctly believe what context holds but nevertheless 
misunderstand an utterance.
Zaefferer's constructed datum (1977:338) is used to illustrate 
the use of decision analysis to explain and predict a particular 
reading choice, that is, explain and predict why a particular 
understanding is reached. His datum is reproduced here to illustrate 
the different interpretations which different analysts may make of
a datum.
(1) A There are even fishes that nurse their
(2) B You're kidding me!
(3) A No.
(4) Why?
(5) B Fishes aren't mammals.
(6) A But of course, dolphins for instance.
According to Zaefferer, 'we can state that the outcome of B's 
interpretation of A's utterance of (1) is a reading which implies 
that by uttering (1) A was kidding B, while the correct reading 
implies that A was not' (1977:339). In other words A intended to 
make a serious statement but B understood (1) to be a joke or a 
tease. It seems to us, however, that the misunderstanding is not 
about the seriousness of (1) but is about what 'fishes' refer to. 
B misunderstands 'fishes' to refer to the biological notion of 
'fish,' viz. a vertebrate with cold blood which breathes through 
gills. B therefore responds to (1) as a joke because he cannot 
reconcile this incorrect understanding with his knowledge of the 
real world.
The task of analysing a misunderstanding of this kind is 
problematic because it depends on the analyst's interpretation of 
the datum. Zaefferer's datum highlights the difficulty: the datum 
is constructed and therefore one would not expect it to be open to 
interpretations other than those which Zaefferer intends it to 
illustrate, yet other interpretations remain possible. This 
possibility leads us to consider the role of the analyst in
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undertaking interpretive work on selected episodes of discourse where 
misunderstanding is involved.
We consider in this respect the difficulties faced by Grimshaw 
(1982) who was a participant in the exchange sequence he presents 
for analysis. In the course of trying to explain the nature of a 
misunderstanding which occurred during the exchange, Grimshaw notes 
'As a participant, I did not, apparently, know "what was going 
on." As an analyst I believe something was going on - I still don't 
know exactly what is was' (1982:37).
Grimshaw uses the term 'mishearing' for failing to understand 
correctly; it is this failure that we have reserved for the term 
'misunderstanding.' The term 'misunderstanding' is used by Grimshaw 
to refer to anti-understanding which, he explains in a previous 
paper (Grimshaw 1980:36), occurs when having understood an utterance 
correctly, one chooses to respond as though it had not been 
understood correctly, or in where the misunderstanding has been 
intentional. Grimshaw discusses a taxonomy of outcomes of 
communicative events which provides the following outcomes: 
nonhearing, understood as intended, non (or partial or ambiguous) 
understanding, mishearing and misunderstanding (that is, intentional 
misunderstanding).
The criteria which distinguish mishearing (that is, 
misunderstanding) from the others are (a) that the hearer is 
confident of having correctly heard and interpreted the speaker's 
utterance and (b) that the hearer has the linguistic capacity to 
understand the utterance correctly, that is, should know the meaning 
of the constituents and so on. Despite these criteria, Grimshaw 
has difficulty in determining the outcomes for some of his data: 
'Five and six represent cases of partial understanding ... that 
shade off into mishearing. Both could also be read as 
Misunderstanding' (1980:49). 'Five' and 'six' are in fact 
constructed data and therefore lack a context which might have 
helped in the analysis. Consequently, in a later paper, Grimshaw 
was to investigate an episode of naturally occurring conversation 
in which details of context could be recovered since he was a 
participant in the exchange.
Grimshaw subjects this episode to an adaptation of Labov and 
Fanshel's (1977) comprehensive discourse analysis. In addition, 
he elicits comments from one of the two other participants/ 
interlocutors. In spite of the extra resources upon which he draws 
(his own ethnographic knowledge, his participation, commentary 
from another participant), Grimshaw is not able to determine exactly 
what the episode is 'about' and which communicative outcome ensues.
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He nevertheless makes some instructive observations about the 
episode, namely that: (i) 'those involved appeared to be talking 
at cross-purposes, ' (ii) that at least two of the participants were 
not aware that there was any problem in understanding, (iii) that 
the 'impasse' was not resolved and (iv) that 'even minimal "sense" 
could be made out of the exchange only by recourse to deeper and 
deeper examination of a number of contextual dimensions' (1982:20). 
Thus in this instance it would appear that the participants are 
not themselves troubled by a miscommunication which subsequently 
cannot be understood, even with the benefit of hindsight.
Despite undertaking a very detailed analysis of the episode, 
Grimshaw acknowledges that his analysis has limitations:
The expansions in the appended text are tentative 
and the characterizations of interactional 
moves even more subject to challenge. It is 
not clear, in short, that an analyst can 
confidently claim to understand either 'what 
has been said' or 'what was done' in the colloquy 
(of the participants) (1982: 22).
The fact that the analysis cannot explain the datum is one major 
problem. The fact that Grimshaw is unable to place the communicative 
nonsuccess within his taxonomy is another:
None of the participants in this episode has 
misunderstood. Neither have they, however, 
understood as intended, partially understood, 
or misheard - misread (as I use those terms)
(Grimshaw 1982:23).
Grimshaw's distinctions between partial understanding, 
mishearing and misunderstanding seem difficult to apply. It is 
possible that he has tried to be too specific. By assigning 
indeterminate illocutionary force and different levels of knowledge 
to partial or nonunderstanding and problems with signals and 
defeasibilities such as shortcomings in capacity or attention to 
mishearings ('misunderstandings' in this paper), he focusses on 
the cause of the difficulty rather than the outcome. It might be 
easier to distinguish between the different types of miscommunication 
if one were to focus instead on whether the hearer suspects 
nonsuccess, knows nonsuccess is the outcome or does not know that 
nonsuccess is the outcome; indeed, one of the criteria for mishearing 
(misunderstanding) is that the hearer believes he has correctly 
heard and interrupted the utterance.
This erroneous belief may be in respect of an utterance of 
indeterminate illocutionary force which Grimshaw seems to restrict
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to partial or nonunderstanding. Of course, if one is to focus on 
the hearer's beliefs about the outcome, one has to be able to 
determine what the hearer's beliefs are (for a detailed discussion 
of the hearer's role in misunderstanding, see Humphreys-Jones 1986b) , 
and this leaves the analyst with the kind of interpretive problems 
we raised earlier.
Grimshaw's honest declarations of the difficulties encountered 
in analysing the episode are not simply salutory, they also provide 
considerable impetus for further methodological and theoretical 
exposition. However, whilst he cannot resolve to his own 
satisfaction the overall problem of 'what is going on,' Grimshaw is 
able to establish (i) that participants may gradually become aware 
of nonsuccess, (ii) that not all participants may necessarily become 
aware of nonsuccess and (iii) that the resolving of nonsuccess is 
often a complex task which may be subject to considerations such 
as the importance which participants attach to the conversation 
and so on.
Grimshaw's findings are borne out by the work on inter-ethnic 
and inter-dialectal misunderstandings (Gumperz 1982a; Gumperz and 
Tannen 1979; Milroy 1984; Milroy and McTear 1983; Varonis and Gass 
1985) , which is the final area of focus that we consider for our 
present purpose. The data in these studies are drawn from actual 
conversations and are subjected to detailed interpretation, some 
of which is corroborated by questioning the participants.
Gumperz (1982a) and Gumperz and Tannen (1979) investigate 
discourse strategies by using data from actual conversations in 
which communication is not successful. The object of their research 
is to determine the sociocultural knowledge which interlocutors 
draw on in conversation. The miscommunications which they discuss 
all 'involve mistaken judgements of others' conversational intent' 
(Gumperz and Tannen 1979:321). Those judgements tend to be 
attitudinal and are mostly due to inter-cultural differences between 
interlocutors. The fact that the judgements are mistaken is detected 
retrospectively by the participants and by outside observers.
Milroy (1984) and Milroy and McTear (1983) are similarly 
concerned with the causes and consequences of breakdowns in 
communication. Their examples are drawn from interlocutors who 
have different dialectal backgrounds because the ' internal grammars' 
of such interlocutors are assumed to differ, thus enabling the 
analyst to examine the role of 'linguistic knowledge in 
comprehension' (Milroy 1984:7-8).
Miscommunication is specified in the following way: 'A 
miscommunication may be said to take place when there is a mismatch 
between the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation'
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(Milroy 1984:8). The speaker's intention is not limited to any 
one utterance and the miscommunication can therefore presumably be 
in respect of a larger part of the conversation than one particular 
utterance or in respect of what could be called the underlying 
social motives rather than intended propositional content of the 
utterances.
Milroy (1984) makes an important distinction between 
'misunderstandings,' which involve differences in speaker-hearers' 
semantic analysis of an utterance and which do not interrupt the 
conversation's flow, and 'communication breakdown,' which happens 
when participants are aware that 'something has gone wrong' in the 
conversation. Thus, Milroy's 'misunderstandings' are not separate 
entities within conversation whereas her 'communicative breakdowns' 
are.
From both an applied linguistic and sociolinguistic viewpoint, 
Varonis and Gass (1985) discuss miscommunication between native 
and non-native speakers. They argue that in addition to having 
different language systems, a lack of shared belief space can cause 
communication problems. They suggest seven ways in which 
participants can behave after" there has been a lack of understanding 
and they illustrate each of these with actual data. The seven 
ways in which participants can behave are as follows:
1. Immediate recognition of problem but no comment.
2. Immediate recognition of problem and makes comment.
3. Later recognition of problem but no comment.
4. Later recognition of problem and makes comment.
5. Recognition after conversation but no comment.
6. Recognition after conversation and makes comment.
7. No recognition (Varonis and Gass 1985:328).
These criteria provide a valuable guide to the possible outcomes 
of misunderstanding but the distinction between 'immediately' and 
'later' is not clearly drawn. From the examples given, 'immediate' 
recognition of a communication problem is made when the next speaker 
produces an utterance which comments on or corrects the problem 
and which is adjacent to the utterance which has manifested the 
problem. 'Later' recognition is made when the next speaker pauses 
before producing his comment or correction; in the example of 'later' 
recognition, the correcting utterance is similarly adjacent to the 
utterance which has manifested the problem. It is possible that 
within a conversation a comment or correction could occur 'later' 
in the sense that a number of other utterances and/or speaker turns 
elapse between the utterance which manifests the problem and the 
correction of it.
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Varonis and Gass (1985) analyse an 'extended misunderstanding' 
between a native and a non-native speaker in a telephone service 
encounter. Their analysis considers the participants' beliefs 
about the conversation, the differences between their goals and 
the correlation between the confidence of each participant in his/her 
interpretation and the correctness/incorrectness of that 
interpretation. Although a 'heuristic' for explaining participants' 
confidence in their interpretations is offered, there is no explicit 
account of how the analyst assesses participants' beliefs and goals, 
nor of how confidence in interpretation is actually determined and 
corroborated. Not all the utterances in the datum are given 
accuracy/conf idence coding; two are given the code 'NC' ('Not 
coded'), perhaps because they are deemed incidental to the 
miscommunication.
Whilst the datum is very complex, with one participant changing 
goals five times and the other misunderstanding eleven times, Varonis 
and Gass make a number of important points as a result of their 
analysis. These are enumerated as follows: (i) native speakers 
and non-native speakers have particular problems in communicating,
(ii) conversing in accordance with the Co-operative Principle and 
turn-taking conventions does not necessarily result in understanding,
(iii) participants use 'negotiation routines in which one 
interlocutor indicates difficulty with the interpretation of 
another's utterance' (1985:341) and (iv) when meaning is not 
negotiated between native and non-native speakers their conversation 
is prone to problems. Despite the insights offered by studies 
such as this, approaches to analysing misunderstandings remain 
problematic in a number of different respects and we might now try 
to briefly summarize these.
Firstly, the studies which we have outlined, though often 
highly detailed, rely to varying degrees on informal and inadequately 
evidenced descriptions of the data. Secondly, whilst many of the 
datum are drawn from actual conversations, these tend to be single 
instances of communicative breakdown which appear to have been 
selected in an ad hoc way. Thirdly, there is no agreed model or 
system for analysing such breakdowns. Fourthly, definitions of 
misunderstanding tend to be either extremely vague or ignore the 
interactional dynamic which is negotiated between speaker and hearer. 
Fifthly, the sequencing of misunderstandings can be extremely complex 
and evidence for explaining what has gone wrong may not always 
reside in the text. Finally, we raise the analytic problem of 
'correct interpretation,' a problem which is evident even on 
occasions when, like Grimshaw, we have been participant in the 
episode in question.
Given the nature of these difficulties, we suggest, in the
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following section, how a systematic corpus based analysis of 
misunderstandings may help in beginning to tackle them.
3. A Corpus Based Analysis
The procedure for analysing misunderstandings discussed in this 
section is based on the detailed study presented in Humphreys-Jones 
(1986a). The rationale for undertaking a corpus based approach 
was to determine, in the first instance, the nature and range of 
textual evidence that could be accumulated from interactional 
contexts in which communicative breakdown had occurred. However, 
the would be analyst of such breakdown is faced with the difficulty 
of deciding in advance what some instance of the phenomenon in 
question might consist of. Whilst the nature of this decision 
must obviously affect the kind of corpus that is collected, 
subsequent additions to the corpus may be used to modify the original 
criteria used in the selection of examples. But how can we collect 
instances of misunderstandings when they involve the kind of 
conversational phenomenon whose occurrence cannot be predicted in 
advance?
One could of course collect huge amounts of data in the hope 
that enough instances of the phenomenon will emerge. On the other 
hand, such an approach could prove not only to be time consuming 
but also unproductive; we may fail to provide any instance of the 
kind we are interested in. Fortunately, a precedent for collecting 
chance data of the kind we have in mind has been set by researchers 
of speech error in verbal exchange, many of whom have adopted the 
'diary method.' This method is particularly well illustrated in 
the work of Fromkin (1971) who provides a corpus of over six hundred 
speech errors collected by herself, colleagues and friends. By 
being on the spot, so to speak, the researcher is not only able to 
record the instance in which an error is produced but also has the 
possibility of collecting advantitious data in the form of 
immediately questioning the utterer of the error that has been 
realized. Something of a similar approach was adopted for the 
recording of misunderstandings which formed the corpus collected 
by Humphreys-Jones where these were defined as a type of 
communicative breakdown which 'occurs when a hearer, H, incorrectly 
understands a proposition expressed by a speaker, S, in an utterance 
in interactive conversation where S and H are native speakers' 
(1986:28).
Using the 'diary method' and notwithstanding its limitations 
(for detailed discussion of both the advantages and disadvantages 
of this approach to data collection, see Humphreys-Jones (1986a, 
Chapter II)), a corpus of some one hundred misunderstandings was 
collected along with whatever additional information the analyst
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was able to glean, subsequent to the interactional sequence noted. 
Each datum was then transcribed in ordinary orthography to enable 
inspection and subsequent analysis of the exchange that transpired. 
The question that was subsequently posed in regard to this data 
was simply, 'what if any, kinds of evidence are available in each 
instance to enable the analyst to claim that a misunderstanding 
has occurred?'
In a large number of data in the corpus, one or more of the 
participants actually made overt reference to the fact that something 
had gone wrong and futhermore would frequently provide explanations 
of what had been misunderstood. For example, speakers made 
statements such as 'No that's not what I mean,' indicating to their 
interlocutors that some interpretation of what they had said was 
inappropriate or inaccurate. The same speakers might then continue, 
'What I mean is (such and such)' as a means of further indicating 
what they originally intended to express. In the same way, when 
responding to such utterances as hearers, individuals might 
acknowledge the misunderstanding and apologize as a consequence, 
'Oh I'm sorry, I thought you meant (such and such).' Similar 
evidence is provided for 'mishearing' in statements such as, 'I 
thought you said (such and such).' Where statements of this kind 
are offered, the analyst can make use of them to investigate what 
has happened in the discourse in question and indeed can compare 
such statements in various different interactional contexts.
In the absence of statements of this kind, the analyst must 
look for other kinds of evidence. This evidence may emerge as a 
result of inspecting the relationship between the utterance which 
is thought to have been misunderstood and the utterance which is 
subsequently based on or derives from that misunderstanding.
Within flexible but not infinite limits certain responses to 
utterances are appropriate while others are inappropriate. In the 
case of misunderstandings, the response by the hearer is to a 
different proposition than the one actually expressed by the speaker 
in his/her utterance and therefore the hearer's responding utterance 
is likely to be an inappropriate response, as is shown in the 
following example from the H-J corpus, in which S and H are talking 
about morris dancing:
(1) S: Where do you do this?
(2) H: To make the crops grow.
In response to a question concerning the location of an activity, 
a response detailing a place is appropriate but a response explaining 
the purpose of the activity is inappropriate. In this example, H 
has misunderstood what S was intending to express. Having misheard 
'where' as 'why,' H believes that he is being asked why he morris
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dances and his response in (2) is an answer to this question. In
(2), therefore, H, manifests his misunderstanding of (1). The 
utterance by H which manifests his misunderstanding in the 
conversation is termed the manifestation and the definition of 
what counted as a misunderstanding in the H-J corpus was extended 
to include the presence of a manifestation. Without a manifestation 
there may be no evidence that the misunderstanding has occurred, 
should there be no reference to the misunderstanding in subsequent 
utterances. In addition, the requirement of the presence of a 
manifestation excluded data in which the hearer thought he might 
have misunderstood or encountered a possible problem in understanding 
what the speaker expressed. Rather than believing his/her 
understanding to be correct and basing his response on that 
understanding, the hearer could query the speaker's utterance or 
his own understanding of it and could thus avoid a potential 
misunderstanding.
When the hearer's manifestation is an appropriate response, 
evidence for the occurrence of a misunderstanding is only provided 
by any other utterances which have been exchanged, as in the 
following example in which S and H are listening to a tape which S 






I've only got one side of it.
Why?
Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other, 
Oh I thought you meant it was in mono. 
No I meant only one side of the album.
In (4) H explains her understanding of (1) and in (5) S refutes 
this understanding and explains what she intended to express. From 
these two utterances it is possible to det.ermine that a 
misunderstanding originated in (1). It is not directly manifested 
in (2) because H's response, 'Why?,' is an appropriate response. 
The response to the manifestation elaborates what was expressed in
(1) and thus makes H realize. that is, become aware that she has 
misunderstood (1). H's explanation of her understanding of (1) 
not only provides S with an indication that something has gone 
wrong but also enables the analyst to cite evidence for this 
realization.
In order to ascertain that a misunderstanding has indeed 
occurred, then, the analyst must not only make recourse to what has 
actually been said but must also scrutinize the data for 
contextualization cues that may indicate some response has been 
communicatively inappropriate or problematic in some way. However, 
in undertaking such analyses of the data it is clear that the analyst 
can only judge what has gone on in his or her own terms, that is,
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by imposing an interpretation on the data. But how can the analyst 
validate his/her own interpretation of what has gone wrong?
An important and often neglected source of supportive evidence 
for undertaking interpretive work of the kind we have considered 
can in fact be provided by the participants themselves. If, for 
example, a misunderstanding is reported to a third party after it 
has occurred, it is obvious that the individual making the report 
must have realized that something had gone wrong. This realization 
may help to confirm the analyst's own interpretation of events in 
something of the manner of Bertrand Russell who suggested that 
'the oftener things are found together, the more probable it becomes 
that they will be found together another time, and that, if they 
have been found together often enough, the probability will amount 
almost to certainty...probability is all we seek' (1912:22),
With regard to misunderstandings, it is possible to examine a 
corpus of collected examples with a view to identifying their 
probable structural characteristics. Thus in the example we have 
just considered, the misunderstanding originates in (1) and is 
manifested in (2) ; these utterances are termed origin and 
manifestation respectively and they correspond with the sequencing 
discussed in the majority of studies discussed in the previous 
section. Both Jefferson and Schwartz, for example, discuss a 
sequence in which the misunderstood utterance is followed by an 
utterance based on the misunderstanding which in turn is followed 
by a correction. Such adjacency is not the case in the example 
since the 'correction' is made by (5), the utterance in which S 
reputes H's understanding and explains what was intended. The 
'correction' is the consequence of an utterance by H which 
acknowledges and explains the misunderstanding; this utterance by 
H follows S's elaboration of the origin utterance. The datum is 
considerably shorter and less complex than the examples discussed 
by Grimshaw and by Varonis and Gass yet, like their data it is not 
amenable to an analysis based on sequencing.
Isolating embedded sequences within an exchange seems to be a 
clumsy way of analysing the utterances involved in a misunderstanding 
when we can make reference not only to the origin and manifestation 
of the breakdown but also the utterance which resolves the 
misunderstanding. In the misunderstanding about the tape recording, 
for example, both participants realize that the misunderstanding 
has occurred and go on to resolve it so that it is effectively closed 
and thus extends no further into the exchange. In the H-J corpus, 
it is notable that 72% of the examples were realized in this manner, 
that is, the participants were aware that communication had broken 
down due to misunderstanding and took steps to repair or resolve 
the damage.
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However, we also need to account for more problematic cases 
of misunderstanding where the breakdown may be resolved for one 
participant but not the other as in the following example.
(1) S: Tim and Harry were going to the Ayr races with Steven
Jackson
(2) H: Where?
(3) S : Ayr
(4) H: Oh
Because S, Tim and Harry are all airport staff, H understands (1) 
to refer to 'air races' and wishes to find to out where they are 
being held. On being told 'Ayr,' a partial repetition of (1), she 
realizes that she has misunderstood (1) and consequently appreciates 
that S is talking about 'horse' as opposed to 'aeroplane' racing 
as the former takes place in the town of 'Ayr.' S does not realize 
that a misunderstanding has occurred and the sequence is unaffected 
for him. H, on the other hand, does realize a misunderstanding 
has occurred, acknowledges this fact (this acknowledgement is taken 
by S to be a neutral comment on the information he imparts in (1)) 
and closes the sequence accordingly.
Only, 12% of examples in the corpus were of this type, though 
there were a further 3% of cases where neither participant realized 
that a misunderstanding had occurred. In these instances, the 
participants presumably left the conversation with different 
understandings of what had gone on but had not perceived this to 
be communicatively problematic.
In the remaining 13% of examples, it was not possible to 
determine whether or not one or more participants realized that 
any problem existed. Thus, in 25% of the corpus, one could analyse 
different sequences for the misunderstanding according to which 
participant's perspective one was adopting. What is detected as a 
misunderstanding for one participant may not be detected as such 
by the other. Consequently, the different understandings which 
participants may have of the conversation means that the course of 
any misunderstanding has to be charted differently for each 
participant.
However, dealing with discourse from the point of view of the 
participants requires attention to be paid to their 'intentions' 
and 'understandings' as well as to their utterances and to this 
end a system of reference was devised to account for (i) what the 
speaker intended to express, (ii) what utterance the speaker produced 
(origin), (iii) what utterance the hearer perceived and decoded,
(iv) what the hearer understood to have been expressed and (v) 
what utterance the hearer produced in response, based on and 
manifesting his misunderstanding (manifestation). These criteria
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were thought to be of particular importance because a 
misunderstanding involves disparity between (i) and (iv) and this 
disparity is the consequence of problems which the hearer has with 
either (ii) or (iii) or both; the disparity is manifested in the 
conversation in (v) . Many of the other utterances in each datum 
could be analysed in terms of their relationship with these five 
reference points, which avoided the lengthy descriptions that are 
possible in the detailing of one or two misunderstands but are not 
practicable in respect of a corpus of one hundred.
In addition to these factors, the points in the conversation 
at which each participant realized the misunderstanding had occurred 
were identified so that the change from one understanding to another 
could be delimited, wherever possible.
4. Concluding Remarks
By applying the analysis outlined above, it was possible to 
undertake a systematic classification of the types and structural 
characteristics of misunderstandings within the corpus. We would 
suggest that this exercise is not mere 'listing' but rather agree 
with the view of Carvell and Svartik (1969:29) who argue that 'a 
classification of a set of objects is a system of reference for 
the objects together with rules for referring them to it' (1969:29).
However, when the 'objects' are misunderstandings, the reference 
system and its rules must embrace all aspects of the communication 
process, or at least as many as the analyst can identify. By 
recognizing the need for such an approach, the work being developed 
by Humphreys-Jones aims to demonstrate the methodological and 
theoretical advantages of undertaking a 'process' type analysis as 
suggested by Widdowson (1979). But that is not all, since the 
analysis put forward is also sensitive to Widdowson's other line 
of approach which is to deal with discourse ' in detachment from 
its instantiation, after the event, as a product' (1979:70-71). To 
this end, commentary and corroboration of what went on in the 
exchanges which constitute the corpus were sought from the 
participants. Although only drawn on informally in Humphreys-Jones 
(1986a), the nature of these comments were considered as extremely 
important for the research, since they provided evidence and 
information that would otherwise not have been accessible to the 
analyst.
Detailed discussion of the nature of this evidence and 
information are outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we 
suggest that further exploration of participant commentaries of 
this kind can and would help to provide an important data base for 
launching work on conversational inferencing such as Gumperz (1986a;
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1986b) has pioneered and that McGregor (1985; 1986; forthcoming) is 
seeking to develop.
By focussing on the inferential skills of third person 
participant and non-participant judges, this work aims to model 
the kinds of sociolinguistic knowledge that may be utilised by 
individuals in situated interpretation of communicative events. 
It also enables us to provide a framework to account for the 
possibilities of multiple interpretation of conversational data 
such as were raised at various point in our discussion. Indeed, 
McGregor (1985) argues that the need to account for these differences 
is paramount since analysts ought to provide a framework for 
inferencing that goes beyond their own subjective platforms. If 
we take the difficulties expounded by Grimshaw (1982) as a case in 
point, then there is little doubt of the care that must be taken.
Whatever research path we choose to follow, it is clear that 
any attempt to investigate the complex processes that underpin the 
nature of everyday communicative activity can gain much from the 
kind of approach we have outlined here, not only when this activity 
is perceived to have broken down, as in the case of 
misunderstandings, but also when it is considered as successful or 
at the very least unproblematic by its participants.
FOOTNOTES
1. . .'This paper is the consequence of a long standing series of 
discussions and reflects the often overlapping research interests 
of the authors. Whilst work on the paper was equally shared, the 
data and findings are based on the doctoral research presented in 
Humphreys-Jones (1986a).
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